PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD:
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ABSTRACT
This iBrief examines the U.S. strategy for strengthening the
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in Southeast Asia
through the use of free trade agreements (FTAs). After briefly
examining the U.S. methodology for strengthening IPRs outside the
U.S., this iBrief predicts that the intellectual property provisions in
the final text of the U.S.-Thailand FTA, which is currently being
negotiated, will be very similar to the provisions in previous FTAs
that the United States has negotiated with other developing
countries.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The violation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is a huge global
problem. The World Customs Organization estimates that counterfeiting
accounts for six percent of global merchandise trade. 2 The World Health
Organization reports that approximately ten percent of medicines worldwide
are counterfeited, costing the pharmaceutical industry over forty-five billion
dollars a year. 3 What is more, thirty-nine percent of the software used by
companies worldwide qualifies as being pirated. 4
¶2
Like many developing nations, Thailand is a source of pirated
goods. 5 According to the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, in
recent years nearly sixty percent of counterfeit apparel seized by customs
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authorities in the European Community originated in Thailand. 6
Furthermore, Thailand has been designated by the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) as a country that needs to improve its intellectual
property (IP) protection regime. 7
¶3
For over twenty years, the U.S. has been increasing its emphasis on
the protection of IPRs outside its borders, and Thailand is the next stop on
this campaign. This iBrief examines the U.S. strategy for strengthening
IPRs in developing nations and predicts some of the provisions to be
included in the intellectual property chapter of the U.S.-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement (FTA).

I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION OUTSIDE THE U.S.
¶4
Since the 1960s, IP protection around the globe has been critical to
the developed world, the U.S. included. Developed countries were losing
their traditional advantage in the production of manufactured goods, and the
only remaining comparative advantage rested in high-tech goods. Because
high-tech goods are generally expensive to create but cheap to copy, and
because international trade meant that these high-tech goods were sold
around the world, countries like the U.S. needed IPRs to be enforced
globally. 8
¶5
The U.S. first sought to protect IPRs through an international
agreement on the trade of counterfeit goods, introduced at the Tokyo Round
of negotiations of what later became the World Trade Organization (WTO).
However, the agreement was thwarted by a united front of developing
countries, and the U.S. was forced to change strategies to accomplish its
goals. 9 First, the U.S. turned to unilateral pressure to increase IPRs in the
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developing world through legislation called “Special 301.”10 The U.S. later
turned its attention to bilateral negotiations resulting in dozens of bilateral
investment treaties and FTAs. 11

A. Special 301
¶6
In order to achieve the desired levels of IP protection in developing
nations, the U.S. amended the Trade Act of 1974 to link trade and IP via an
instrument known as “Special 301.” 12 The “Special 301” provisions of the
amended Trade Act require the USTR “to identify foreign countries that
deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights or fair
and equitable market access” for U.S. citizens or entities that rely on IP
protection. 13 Depending on the extent of deficiency of IP protection, these
foreign countries are placed onto either the “Priority Foreign Countries” list,
the “Priority Watch List,” the “Watch List,” or the “Section 306
Monitoring” list. 14
¶7
In its 2005 Special 301 Report, the USTR placed fifty-two countries
on one of these lists. 15 “A 301 investigation may culminate in a bilateral
agreement between the [U.S.] and the target state, or failing that, the
imposition of trade sanctions by the [U.S.] . . . .” 16 As a result, bilateral
agreements between the U.S. and its trading partners have been increasing
since the 1980s. 17

Eventually, the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations produced an
agreement known as the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which requires all WTO members to
adhere to minimum standards of IP protection. 18 Despite having the TRIPS
agreement, the U.S. continues to use bilateral agreements to extend the level
¶8
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of IP protection in developing nations beyond the minimal standards laid
out in TRIPS. 19

B. Bilateral Policy: BITs and FTAs
¶9
As one of the world’s most ardent advocates of stronger protections
for IP, “the U.S. has consistently followed a policy of elevating IPRs
standards abroad through the use of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
action.” 20 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and FTAs are part of “a
ratcheting process that is seeing IP norms globalize at a remarkable rate.” 21

The U.S. is a party to nearly forty BITs. 22 A BIT is an agreement
between two sovereign nations to establish a stable investment climate
within their borders for the investors of the parties to the agreement. While
the purpose of a BIT is to protect investment, IP also receives protection as
a byproduct. For example, the Mozambique Bilateral Investment Treaty, 23
which entered into force in 2005, protects intellectual property as a type of
investment. 24

¶10

¶11
BITs are not the best method for improving IP protection in
developing nations for a number of reasons, all relating to their brevity in
comparison to FTAs. An FTA is an agreement between two or more
sovereign nations to remove all substantial barriers to trade (e.g. tariffs,
regulatory requirements) between the nations. First, BITs, while including
IP as a type of investment, do not devote an entire article or chapter to IP as
FTAs do. Therefore, the protection afforded IP by the treaty is less detailed
and also less predictable. Second, the main purpose of BITs is the
assurance that foreign investors will be given the same treatment afforded to

19
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domestic investors. 25 On the other hand, the IP chapters in FTAs seek to
completely change the IP regime in the developing signatory State, thus
giving foreign IP owners in developing nations more protection than existed
in developing countries before the FTA was signed.
¶12
Consequently, the U.S. has become increasingly involved in FTA
negotiations. The remainder of this iBrief will focus on the FTA
negotiations between Thailand and the U.S. More specifically, this iBrief
will use the precedent set by previous U.S. FTAs to demonstrate that the IP
provisions that will be included in the U.S.-Thai agreement will likely be
very similar to those previously negotiated agreements.
¶13
FTA negotiations between the U.S. and Thailand began in July
2004 and are expected to conclude sometime this year. 26 Thus far, six
rounds of negotiations have occurred, 27 and IPRs, especially relating to the
pharmaceutical industry, have already been dubbed “a sensitive issue” by
negotiators on both sides. 28

II. A SNAPSHOT OF THAI IP LAW
Thailand has numerous laws in place to protect IP. 29 However,
enforcement of those laws remains an issue. Enforcement of IPRs in
Thailand is slowly meeting foreign investors’ objectives in policing the
marketplace to suppress fakes and pirated goods. 30 “A key factor to
improvement of enforcement efforts is having IP owners work in close
cooperation with Thai law enforcement and government agencies.” 31 Such
¶14
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cooperation is slowly happening throughout the country, but Thailand still
has a significant way to go before IP infringement will be under control.
¶15
While enforcement is of utmost priority in improving the IP regime
in Thailand, the new IP provisions of the Thai FTA provisions are also
extremely important. These new provisions will have a significant impact
on the IP marketplace as Thai IP law is brought more in line with U.S. law.

III. PREDICTIONS FOR THE U.S.-THAI AGREEMENT
¶16
Due to the strength of the U.S. as compared to the majority of its
trading partners, the bilateral agreements to which it is a party are typically
very similar. Drahos notes that:

In bilateral trade negotiations between states involving a strong and
weak state, generally speaking the strong state comes along with a
prepared draft text which acts as a starting point for the negotiations...
In order to lower the transaction costs of bilateralism the [U.S.] has
developed models or prototypes of the kind of bilateral treaties it
wishes to have with other countries... So, for example, … the Free
Trade Agreement that the [U.S.] has negotiated with Jordan will serve
as a model for other FTAs being negotiated with Chile and
Singapore.” 32
¶17
A central aspect of the most recent series of FTAs entered into by
the U.S. is the establishment of IP protections that exceed the TRIPS
minimum standards. This section of the iBrief predicts the IP provisions of
the Thai-US FTA based on an examination of the IP chapters in the
following U.S. FTAs: 33

1. The Singaporean FTA, signed in January 2003, is the
first FTA between the U.S. and a Southeast Asian
State; 34
2. The Chilean FTA, signed in June 2003, is the first
FTA between the U.S. and a South American
country; 35 and
32

Drahos, supra note 9, at 794.
These particular agreements were chosen because their intellectual property
provisions are representative of the intellectual property chapters in all the most
recent U.S. FTAs. For a more in-depth discussion involving all of the most
recent FTAs, see Home Page of Consumer Project on Technology,
http://www.cptech.org/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
34
United States—Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003
[hereinafter Singapore FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/S
ection_Index.html.
33
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3. The Australian FTA, signed in May 2004, is the first
FTA signed in the 21st century between the U.S. and a
developed country. 36

A. Patent Law: Pharmaceuticals
1. Patent Term Extension
¶18
Much of the controversy surrounding IP protection involves issues
affecting the pharmaceutical industry. 37 One such protection, which is
strongly advocated by the pharmaceutical industry, is patent term extension.
Extension for a patent term is sought when an abnormal delay in the
regulatory approval process reduces the effective life of a patent. The
Singaporean, Chilean, and Australian FTAs all contain provisions granting
patent term extensions when a delay in the granting of a patent exceeds a
certain amount of time (four to five years). 38 In addition, each of the
agreements grants extensions to compensate for “unreasonable delay” in the
granting of regulatory marketing approval. 39
Because patent term extension provisions have been included in the
most recent U.S. FTAs, it is highly likely that similar provisions will also
be included in the final text of the Thai agreement. As the Thai drug
regulatory office frequently delays approval of drugs, 40 it is expected that
¶19
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http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/12/cafta_drugs/index_np.html.
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40
“The major obstacles to foreign companies lie in skirting the regulatory
system's widespread corruption, which can manifest itself in everything from
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patent term extension provisions will be heavily relied on by the foreign
pharmaceutical industry in Thailand to lengthen the effective life 41 of its
drug patents.
2. Compulsory Licensing
¶20
A second issue is the compulsory licensing of patents, which is
currently allowed (though never exercised) by the government under Thai
law. 42 This issue has been addressed by the U.S. FTAs in two different
manners. 43 The first approach, used in the Chilean agreement, applies the
TRIPS standards. 44 TRIPS states that governments may issue compulsory
licenses for any reason so long as a certain number of conditions are met
(e.g. prior negotiations for a voluntary license, and royalty payments). 45
Additionally, TRIPS allows for the waiver of the conditions in certain
situations. 46 A second approach, used in the Singaporean and Australian
agreements, limits the use of compulsory licenses to antitrust remedies,
public non-commercial use, or national emergencies. 47
¶21
In the Thai agreement, the provision for compulsory licenses could
follow either of the manners described above—TRIPS standard or
limitation to certain situations. Because the majority of pharmaceutical
innovators in Thailand are foreign-owned, the TRIPS standard will be
sought by the Thai negotiators, because it arguably allows greater
opportunity for generic companies to make patented drugs via compulsory
licenses granted by the Thai government. 48 However, even if the more
stringent standard for issuing compulsory licenses found in the Singapore
and Australian FTAs was used, the Thai government would still be able to

Medical—Thailand Medical Publications (1999),
http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/html/ThailandMar1999.htm.
41
The effective life of a patent is the patent term remaining once full regulatory
approval has been granted. While the patent term in the U.S. is twenty years,
the average effective patent life of a drug is ten to twelve years.
42
Thailand Legal Basics: Intellectual Property Rights Laws, a publication by
Tilleke & Gibbins Int’l Ltd., at 18,
http://www.tillekeandgibbins.com/Publications/thailand_legal_basics/index.html.
43
A compulsory license gives permission to another producer to make the
patented product without the patent holder's consent.
44
Chile FTA, supra note 35, art. 17.1.5.
45
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31.
46
Id.
47
Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.7.6; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art.
17.9.7.
48
See Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, Tightening Trips: The
Intellectual Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade Agreements, (Int’l
Trade Dep’t of the World Bank Group) Feb. 7, 2005, at 2,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/worldbank02072005.pdf.
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issue compulsory licenses under the conditions of a national emergency or
for public, non-commercial use. 49
3. Linkage Between Patent Status and Generic Drug Approval
¶22
A third issue involves the linkage between a patent’s status and
generic drug marketing approval. In other words, the issue is whether a
generic drug can be given marketing approval during the life of the patent
from which the generic drug is derived. For this particular issue, the
Singaporean agreement has been the gold-standard, its wording adopted
almost verbatim by all subsequent U.S. FTAs. 50 The Singaporean
agreement states that the regulatory authority may not grant marketing
approval to a generic drug while the brand name drug is under patent
(unless authorized by the patent owner), and, in addition, the patent owner
must be notified of the name of the generic company requesting marketing
approval. 51
¶23
It is highly probable that the Thai agreement will also proscribe
Thailand from granting marketing approval for generic drugs while the
brand name drug is under patent (unless authorized by the patent holder).
This provision effectively renders compulsory licenses ineffectual since it is
unlikely that a pharmaceutical patent owner will grant permission for a
generic company to market its patented drug, effectively undercutting the
patent holder in the marketplace. 52 Additionally, even once the drug goes
off patent, this provision will still delay the availability of generic drugs
since they may no longer be approved and prepared for market distribution
while the brand name drug is under patent.

4. Data Exclusivity
¶24
A fourth issue is data exclusivity. To obtain marketing approval,
pharmaceutical manufacturers must submit a significant amount of clinical
data to regulatory bodies—data that typically costs hundreds of millions of
dollars to produce. 53 Generic drug manufacturers can later use that data to
develop and approve their own generic versions of the drugs, thus bypassing
a significant cost of pharmaceutical manufacturing. Data exclusivity
49

The generic manufacturers, however, would need to become state-owned, or
in some other manner, non-commercial.
50
See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note 35, art. 17.10.2.b-c.; Australia FTA, supra
note 36, art. 17.10.4.b-c.
51
Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.8.4.b-c.
52
Fink and Reichenmiller, supra note 48, at 2.
53
See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Website, What
Goes Into the Cost of Prescription Drugs, June 2005,
http://www.phrma.org/files/Cost_of_Perscription_Drugs.pdf.

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 10

provisions essentially grant patent-like protection of the clinical data to their
creator for a certain amount of time and for many of the same reasons that
an actual patent is given to the pharmaceutical innovators. Again, the
Singapore FTA has set the standard for all subsequent agreements,
providing five years of data exclusivity for the creators of clinical data. 54
Additionally, under the Australian agreement’s provisions, once marketing
approval has been granted in another territory based on clinical data, that
clinical data gains exclusivity in the territories of the Parties to the
agreement. 55
¶25
Like its predecessor, the Thai FTA will likely have a provision
which grants data exclusivity for five years. Due to the huge expense in
gathering clinical data, this provision will hamper the efforts of generic drug
companies seeking to approve drugs based on data previously submitted by
pharmaceutical innovators, and will also present another obstacle for the
Thai government when seeking to make use of compulsory licenses. 56
¶26
It is likely that the U.S. negotiators will also push for a provision
like that in the Australian agreement (described above), which grants data
exclusivity in all FTA jurisdictions once the data has been approved by a
regulatory authority in another country—even if that country is not a
signatory of the FTA. Thus in Thailand, generic manufacturers will not be
allowed for a certain amount of time to rely on the clinical data submitted to
a foreign regulator when seeking regulatory or marketing approval for its
generic drug in Thailand. 57

5. Implications
¶27
Because many of the issues above are not addressed in detail, if at
all, under current Thai law, the above predicted provisions will have a
number of effects in Thailand with regards to pharmaceutical drugs. First,
the above provisions will likely hamper the availability of generic drugs.
The agreement will likely reduce the amount of generic drugs that come to
market and will also likely lengthen the amount of time it takes for generics
to get to market. Additionally, the added protections given to
pharmaceutical patents and clinical data will increase costs to local generic
manufacturers due to the added burden of obtaining regulatory and
marketing approval. This in turn will raise costs of generic medicines.
These higher costs will likely lead to the prescribing of older, off-patent
54

Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.8.1-3; See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note
35, art. 17.10.1.
55
Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.10.
56
Fink and Reichenmiller, supra note 48 at 2.
57
“In other words, test data exclusivity applies automatically in all FTA
jurisdictions, once a company submits test data to a drug regulator in
one territory—even outside the FTA area.” See id. at 3.
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drugs, by government physicians because the older, off-patent drugs are less
expensive, and thus are more likely to be approved for use under the
national health plan.

B. Patent Law: Plants
¶28
A fifth issue, also related to patent law, is the patenting of life forms
and, specifically, plants. Those that support life form patenting maintain
that granting patents motivates researchers to develop more healthy and
productive forms of plants and animals. Patented life forms include
pesticide-resistant crops, larger, meatier livestock, etc. Those that oppose
the patenting of life forms fear that “big business” will oust local farmers
and lay claim to the natural resources of developing countries. Both the
Singaporean and the Chilean agreements include no general exclusions of
plants and animals from patentability. 58 The Australian agreement allows
exclusions of life form patents only for “moral, health, or safety reasons.”59
¶29
All recent U.S. FTAs have included provisions allowing for
patenting of life forms, especially plants, and it is more than likely that a
similar provision will be included in the Thai agreement. This is one of the
most highly debated areas within the Thai agreement negotiations due to the
fact that plants are not protected under the current regime 60 and due to the
argument that such a provision would have a detrimental impact on
Thailand’s jasmine rice industry. The National Human Rights Commission
of Thailand contends that such a provision “would allow the American plant
genetic researchers and companies to patent over any new variety of rice
developed from Thai jasmine rise.” 61 The Commission believes that this
provision will greatly damage the agricultural industry in Thailand. 62
However, others maintain that such a provision will not greatly alter the
jasmine rice industry in Thailand nor be overtaken by foreign competitors.63
Proponents of life form patents maintain that patenting new types of rice
will not prevent local farmers from growing the original strain of rice.

58

Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.7.1; Chile FTA, supra note 35, art.
17.9.2.
59
Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.9.2.a.
60
See supra note 29.
61
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Official Statement of
Concern over Ongoing Negotiations on the Thai-US Free Trade Agreement
(Aug. 14, 2005), unofficial translation available at
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2485.
62
Id.
63
Pichit Likitkijsomboon, Of Rice and Men, TECH CENT. STATION, July 8, 2005,
http://www.techcentralstation.com/070805PL.html.
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C. Copyright Law
¶30
Patent law is not the only sector of IP to be affected by FTAs. The
copyright provisions of the U.S.-Thai agreement will likely also reflect the
trend of increasing IPR protection. Many of the provisions relating to
copyright have been standard since the Singapore FTA, and it is unlikely
that the U.S. negotiators will vary from those provisions. For example,
beginning with the Singaporean agreement and onward, FTA provisions on
the term of copyright protection have been virtually identical—life of the
author plus seventy years, or if the term is decided on the basis on
something other than the author’s life, seventy years from the publication or
creation of the work. 64 Consequently, the Thai agreement will likely mimic
the provisions in the Singapore FTA, bringing Thai copyright terms into
conformity with the majority of the developed world. Currently, Thailand’s
term for copyright protection is fifty years. 65 Thus, this new provision will
substantially alter the copyright regime in Thailand and will also have a
substantial impact on the issue of works falling into the public domain.
¶31
Another example of copyright protection standardization in U.S.
FTAs is illustrated by the technological protection measures given to
copyrighted works. 66 Again, beginning with the Singaporean agreement
and moving forward, the provisions on this matter are virtually identical,
stating that countries must provide “adequate legal protection and effective
remedies” against acts or devices that circumvent technological protection
measures, with exemptions given to certain institutions (e.g., libraries and
educational institutions). 67 As in previous FTAs, the Thai FTA will likely
state that Thailand must provide adequate protections and remedies against
actions or devices that circumvent technological protection measures.

Thai law has not kept up with evolving technology and the FTA
provisions will add much in this area. For example, currently computer
programs are not given defined protection under copyright law in Thailand.
Needless to say, the issue of technological protection measures also has not
been addressed. Thus, the FTA provisions, while modernizing Thailand’s
copyright protection regime, will at the same time be taking away many of
the “rights” Thai IP users are accustomed to having under the current
regime.
¶32

64

See, e.g., Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.4.4; Chile FTA, supra note
35, art. 17.5.4; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.4.4.
65
See Thailand Copyright Act B.E. 2521 (A.D. 1978) and Thailand Copyright
Act B.E. 2537 (A.D. 1994).
66
Technological protection measures are devices and software developed to
prevent unauthorized copying of digital works. Fink and Reichenmiller, supra
note 48, at 4.
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Singapore FTA, supra note 34, art. 16.4.7. See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note
35, art. 17.7.5; Australia FTA, supra note 36, art. 17.4.7.
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CONCLUSION
¶33
Thailand has much to gain from a FTA with the U.S. The U.S. is
Thailand’s largest export market with sales of a variety of goods and
commodities climbing sixteen percent last year to almost eighteen-billion
dollars. 68 Additionally, according to a study conducted by the Thailand
Development Research Institute in Bangkok, the U.S.-Thailand FTA is
projected to boost trade between the two countries by a full five percent. 69
¶34
It is likely that the U.S.-Thailand FTA will contain IP provisions
similar to those found in previous U.S. FTAs, which will require a number
of broad changes to occur in Thailand. First, many of Thailand’s IP laws
will need to be re-written, or entirely new laws will need to be passed, in
order to comply with the FTA. Additionally, as enforcement of IPRs in
Thailand remains a consistent problem, the U.S. will undoubtedly place a
heavier emphasis on this issue in the months and years following the
signing of the agreement.
¶35
While the FTA provisions will perhaps harm certain sectors of the
Thai economy like generic drug manufacturing in the short term, the FTA
will prove to be a driving force in the development and growth of the Thai
economy as a whole. Trade will increase with the U.S. as a result of the
FTA, and foreign investors will be less apprehensive about making IP
investments into the country if Thailand increases IP protection.
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Benefits of US, Thai Free Trade Agreement Examined, CalTrade Rep., July
18, 2005, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2315.
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